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ABSTRACT
We show how support for information-flow security proofs could
be added on top of the Verified Software Toolchain (VST). We dis-
cuss several attempts to define information flow security in a VST-
compatible way, and present a statement of information flow secu-
rity in “continuation-passing” style.
Moreover, we present Hoare rules augmented with information
flow control assertions, and sketch how these rules could be proven
sound with respect to the definition given before.
We also discuss how this can be implemented in the Coq proof
assistant,1 and howVST’s proof automation framework (VST-Floyd)
can be adapted to support convenient information flow security
proofs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Software plays a crucial role in today’s world, and software bugs
can cause great damage. To minimize the impact of bugs and mali-
cious behavior, various kinds of “supervisor” and information dis-
patch software has been developed, such as operating systems, hy-
pervisors, network switches, firewalls, etc, which manage and re-
strict the interactions between different software components to
achieve certain security guarantees.
For performance reasons, the interaction managing software is
often implemented in low-level languages such as C, and it is hard
to ensure that these crucial pieces of software are correct. The Ver-
ified Software Toolchain (VST) [4] offers a way to formally verify
functional correctness of C programs, but it does not support rea-
soning about the information flow between different components.
Therefore, we present VST-Flow, a proposal for an extension
to VST allowing to reason about information flow policies. That
is, we introduce a way to assign a high or low sensitivity level to
data, and extend VST’s Hoare rules to include these classifications,
which results in a convenient technique to prove non-interference
for C programs, i.e. to prove that the values of high data do not
influence the values of low data.
Many such systems have been presented before [8, 11, 13], where
the user can prove that a program respects a desired information
flow policy by applying a given set of rules. The judgment form of
these rules might vary between different approaches, some being
closer to typing rules, while others being closer to Hoare rules, but
as far as we know, the soundness statement of all these systems
is in “direct-style”. By “direct-style”, we mean that the soundness
statement roughly has the form “if some condition ϕ1 holds in state
σ1, and we run the command c , then we end up in a state σ2 where
the condition ϕ2 holds.”
Depending on the approach, ϕ1 and ϕ2 might be the same, and
in the typical case, σ1 and σ2 are pairs of two states, and ϕ1 and ϕ2
1The Coq development is available at https://github.com/samuelgruetter/vst-ifc.
state low-equivalence, i.e. that all low values have the same value
in the two states of the pair.
However, as explained by Appel [1, 2], to support premature ex-
its such as break, continue, and return, and to support reasoning
about concurrent executions, a soundness statement in “continuation-
passing” style2 is preferable. By “continuation-passing” style, we
mean that the soundness statement roughly has the form “for all
states σ2 satisfying condition ϕ2 and all continuations k , if it is safe
to run k in σ2, then it is also safe to run c followed by k in any state
σ1 satisfying ϕ1.”
For Hoare triples {P} c {Q}, it is easy to formulate soundness in
continuation-passing style by settingϕ1 = P and ϕ2 = Q . However,
it is not immediately clear how to state an information flow secu-
rity property in continuation passing style, and this is the main
challenge addressed in this paper. Overall, we make the following
contributions:
• We present a definition of information flow security in
continuation passing style.
• We state information-flow aware Hoare rules and sketch
for some of them how to prove them sound with respect
to our definition of information flow security.
• We discuss how shallow embedding of the assertion lan-
guage into themetalanguage combinedwith universal quan-
tification can lead to a vacuous information flow security
statement, and how to avoid this pitfall.
• We present the verification of a sample C program in Coq,
suggesting that verifying information flow security prop-
erties with VST-Flow will only require a minimal addi-
tional effort compared to verifying functional correctness
with VST-Floyd [7].
• Finally, we discusswhat it would take to reach a first sound
and usable milestone of this project.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains
the overall architecture and relationship to VST. It is followed by
some introductory examples in section 3, and section 4 explains
how we state information flow security in continuation-passing
style. Section 5 presents information flow aware Hoare rules, sec-
tion 6 discusses some design choices, and section 7 shows what it
would take to reach a first milestone. We also discuss what could
be done beyond a first milestone in section 8, as well as related
work in section 9, and we conclude in section 10.
2 ARCHITECTURE
VST builds on top of CompCert, a verified C compiler which comes
with formal semantics for C and assembly, and a proof that com-
pilation preserves program behavior. Verifiable C provides Hoare
2Actually, continuations are not really passed around, but rather, put onto a continua-
tion stack, but he still calls it continuation-passing style, so we stick to this terminol-
ogy here.
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Figure 1: Architecture (new components in bold)
rules for C, and proves them sound with respect to CompCert’s
C semantics. Since the raw Hoare rules of Verifiable C are not
very convenient for users to verify programs, a library called VST-
Floyd [7] was built on top of this, which restates the Hoare rules
in a more convenient form, and provides separation logic asser-
tions for structs, arrays and any nesting thereof, as well as proof
automation scripts to provide a simple to use verification IDE.
Since verification of information flow properties often needs
strong invariants, it is very useful to build on the functional cor-
rectness verification framework of VST. We state information flow
aware Hoare rules, which say that everything required by VST
holds, as well as some additional conditions needed to guarantee
information flow security. Their soundness proof reuses the sound-
ness proofs of Verifiable C for the functional correctness part, and
only needs to prove information flow security. On top of IFC C, we
build VST-Flow, providing a similar user interface as VST-Floyd,
but augmented with information flow proof support. The proof au-
tomation part is just in the beginning of the implementation, but
we expect that most parts of the VST-Floyd proof automation could
be reused.
3 EXAMPLES
In this paper, we will only use the two confidentiality levels Lo and
Hi, but our system should be extensible to any lattice with more
levels.
Let us consider the following example:
void f(int v, bool b, int* highptr, int* lowptr) {
if (b) {
*highptr = v;
} else {
*lowptr = v;
}
}
The function f takes a boolean flag b, which indicates whether
the valuev is classified as Hi or Lo, and depending on this, assigns
it to a high-security or low-security part of the memory.
We would like to formally specify that this function does not
leak Hi data into memory regions classified as Lo. In particular,
this means that after running f, the memory location pointed to
by *lowptr should not contain any Hi data.
We will give an information flow security specification for this
function. The purpose of this example is just to give an introduc-
tion, rather than explaining all the notation details, so we will only
give a minimal explanation here:
The specification is in the format f (−→y ) : {P} {R}, where f is
the function name, −→y are its arguments, P is a precondition con-
sisting of a VST assertion, a stack classification (specifying the sen-
sitivity of the data in each stack location) and a heap classification
(specifying the sensitivity of the data in each heap location), and
R is a postcondition in the same way. Here’s the specification:
f(v, b,highptr, lowptr) :
{λx . ((prop()
local(temp v x .v, temp b x .b, temp highptr x .h, temp lowptr x .l)
sep(x .h 7→ _, x .l 7→ _)),
[b : Lo, highptr : Hi, lowptr : Lo, v : if x .b then Hi else Lo],
[x .l : Lo,x .h : Hi])}
{λx . ((prop()local()sep(
x .h 7→ (if x .b then v else _),x .l 7→ (if x .b then _ else v))),
[],
[x .l : Lo,x .h : Hi])}
The variable x is a record containing logical variables (what VST
would put inside the WITH clause). The stack classification of the
precondition says that the arguments b and lowptr are classified
as Lo, whereas the argument highptr is classified asHi. The classi-
fication of v is value-dependent, i.e. it depends on the value stored
in the variable b, which has to equal x .b according to the local
clause. The heap classification says that the value stored at the lo-
cation x .l (that is, at the address contained in lowptr) is classified
as Lo, and similarly, but Hi, for x .h. Note that we chose to keep
even the address of highptr secret, but it would also be imagin-
able to have [highptr : Lo] in the stack classification, but still to
classify the value stored at highptr asHi in the heap classification.
The postcondition specifies where the value v is written in its
VST part, and its IFC part says that after running the function, x .l
still only contains Lo data.
Such functions are typical use cases of the Cross Domain Desk-
top Compositor [5], a screen compositor connected to two ma-
chines of different security levels, allowing to display data from
these two machines on the same screen and guaranteeing that no
data from the confidential machine leaks into the less confidential
one.
TODO example inspired by CDDC
It should be an example “where abstraction makes no sense”, i.e.
where reasoning at the low-level is the most natural thing to do,
where the security property is tied to the physical representation
of the data.
4 THE INFORMATION FLOW SECURITY
STATEMENT
This section explains our information flow judgment, starting from
the classical Hoare triple, then explaining the additions made by
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VST and then our additions to reason about information flow se-
curity.
4.1 Hoare logic
Hoare logic [9] uses triples of the form
{P} c {R}
intended to mean that if we are in a state where P holds and run
the command c , we will end up in a state where R holds.
4.2 VST logic
VST adds a context ∆ to this judgment, where ∆ gives the types of
function parameters, local and global variables, and specifications
of global functions.
We will use the type alias vst_assert for the type of VST as-
sertions. Conceptually, they can be thought of as a function taking
a stack and a heap and returning a proposition, but the actual type
is a bit more complex because of VST’s step indexing.
While VST does not support goto commands, it does support
break, continue and return before the end of the function body,
and to account for these premature ways of exiting a block of
code, VST’s postconditions are not just of type vst_assert, but
of type exitkind→ option val→ vst_assert, where the type
exitkind is an enum with the four values EKnrm, EKbrk, EKcont,
and EKret (to denote normal code execution until the end of the
code block, or premature exit via break, continue or return, re-
spectively), and the option val is used for the return value if there
is one. Alternatively, VST postconditions can be thought of as a
quadruple of four assertions, one for each possible way of exiting
a code block.
So, VST judgments are written
∆ ⊢ {P} c {R}
where P is of type vst_assert, c is a C statement, and R is of type
exitkind→ option val→ vst_assert.
We will use λ notation to construct functions, so a VST judg-
ment might look like
∆ ⊢ {P} c {λek . λv . P ′}
where ek is an argument of type exitkind and v is an argument
of type option val.
In order to give useful specifications, one usually has to connect
values of the precondition with values of the postcondition. Since
VST’s assertion language is shallowly embedded into the metalan-
guage (i.e. into Coq), we can use universal quantification of the
metalanguage to achieve this, so VST judgments actually have the
form
∀x : T . ∆ ⊢ {P x} c {R x}
where T is a type that the user who writes the specification picks;
typically it is a tuple type, because several metavariables are needed
to connect the pre- and postcondition.
4.3 Adding information flow control
To add support for reasoning about information flow security on
top of this, we need the following definitions:
The type label has the two members Lo and Hi, used to la-
bel data of low and high security, respectively. Our goal will be to
prove that data labeled as Hi does not influence the values of data
labeled as Lo.
Stack classification functions take the name of a stack variable
and return a label for it.Wewill use the letterN (for non-addressable)
to denote stack classification functions, and we introduce the type
stack_clsf as an alias for the function type ident→ label.
We introduce the type heap_loc for heap locations. Heap clas-
sification functions take such a heap_loc and return a label for
it. We will use the letter A (for addressable) to denote heap classifi-
cation functions, and we introduce the type heap_clsf as an alias
for the function type heap_loc→ label.
We now can augment VST assertions to information flow con-
trol (IFC) assertions, by defining the type ifc_assert as an alias
for triples of a vst_assert, a stack_clsf, and a heap_clsf, so
information flow control judgments will have the form
∆ ⊢ {P ,N ,A} c {λek .λv . (P ′,N ′,A′)}
Wewill use calligraphic letters P and Q for IFC preconditions, and
R for IFC postcondition functions depending on an exitkind and
a return value, so whenever we do not need to access the three
parts of IFC assertions separately, we will write judgments of the
form
∆ ⊢ {P} c {R}
Notice that there is an interesting difference between VST’s as-
sertion P and the classification functions N and A: VST’s P carries
its meaning in its definition, that is, if σ is a program state, then
P σ is a proposition (in themetalanguage) expressing some require-
ments on the values of σ . On the other hand, N and A are purely
syntactic constructs whose meaning will only be defined by the
semantic definition of the IFC judgment. That is, P is shallowly
embedded, while N and A are deeply embedded. The latter is not
a design choice, because N and A can only be given meaning in a
bigger context where a pre- and postcondition is available.
4.4 C light operational semantics
We will define information flow security with respect to VST’s
small-step operational semantics for C light. States σ are triples
〈e,k,m〉 of a variable environment e representing the values on
the stack, a continuation stack k consisting of the commands to
execute, and a heap memorym.
We write σ1 → σ2 for the small-step reduction relation, and we
write σ1 →
∗ σ2 for its transitive closure, and σ1 →n σ2 to say
that after n steps, state σ1 ends up in state σ2. Moreover, we define
execution until final state, written σ1 ⇓ σ2, as σ1 →
∗ σ2 where
the command to be executed in σ2 is the empty command, which
means that execution is done (and hasn’t got stuck along the way).
4.5 Defining the semantics of the IFC judgment
In the subsequent sections, we will define the meaning of the IFC
judgment iteratively, by first presenting some simple definitions
which look promising, but turn out to be dead ends. This will then
justify our final, slightly more complex definition.
4.6 Semantics of IFC judgment: First attempt
In order to define the meaning of the IFC judgment, we need the
following auxiliary definition:
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Definition 4.1 (Simple low-equivalence). Two states 〈e,k,m〉 and
〈e ′,k ′,m′〉 are called low-equivalent with respect to the classifica-
tion functions N and A (of type stack_clsf and heap_clsf, re-
spectively) if for all stack locations ℓ for which N (ℓ) = Lo, e(ℓ) =
e ′(ℓ) and for all heap locations ℓ for whichA(ℓ) = Lo,m(ℓ) =m′(ℓ).
We will treat postconditions as if they were of type ifc_assert
(instead of exitkind→ option val→ ifc_assert) for this first
definition attempt, so we ignore premature exits, because the prob-
lem we want to illustrate here already appears in this simpler set-
ting.
Definition 4.2 (Meaning of IFC judgment, first attempt). Themean-
ing of ∆ ⊢ {P1,N1,A1} c {P2,N2,A2} is: The VST judgment ∆ ⊢
{P1} c {P2} holds and for all σ1, σ
′
1, σ2, σ
′
2 , if P1 σ1 and P1 σ
′
1 hold
and both in σ1 and σ
′
1 , the command to be executed is c , and σ1
is low-equivalent to σ ′1 w.r.t N1 and A1, and σ1 ⇓ σ2 and σ
′
1 ⇓ σ
′
2,
then σ2 is low-equivalent to σ
′
2 w.r.t N2 and A2.
Proving this statement for a particular program c would then
prove information flow security for that program in the sense that
Hi data does not influence the values of Lo data, because if we
vary the values of Hi data between σ1 and σ
′
1 , these changes can
only result in variations of Hi data between σ2 and σ
′
2 , but cannot
influence Lo values of σ2 and σ
′
2, because they have to be equal.
4.7 The problem with universal quantification
over an IFC judgment
If we use universal quantification to connect values of the precon-
dition with values of the postcondition, as commonly done in VST,
we don’t get the statement that we want. Let’s consider the follow-
ing example:
∀x : int. ∆ {sec = x, [sec : Hi, pub : Lo],A}
pub := sec
{sec = x ∧ pub = x, [sec : Hi, pub : Lo],A}
where we use square brackets to define the stack classification
functions by enumerating their values for all variable names, and
A is an unspecified irrelevant heap classification function.
Clearly, this statement should not be provable, because it as-
signs the secret Hi variable sec to the public Lo variable pub. How-
ever, it is provable, because to prove the universal quantification,
we assume x to be an arbitrary, but fixed value, so the Hi variable
sec cannot have different values in the states σ1 and σ
′
1 from Def-
inition 4.2, and therefore, pub will always have the same value in
σ2 and σ
′
2, which makes the statement true.
So we see that the way we combined universal quantification
with our definition of information flow security is flawed, because
it does not express what we want it to express.
4.8 Adapting the shape of the IFC judgment
Therefore, we have to give control over the quantification to the
IFC judgment, rather than adding it on the outside. To do so, we
parameterize all pre- and postconditions by a variable x of typeT ,
which can be any user-specified tuple type. That is, preconditions
now have the type T→ ifc_assert, and postconditions have the
type T→ exitkind→ option val→ ifc_assert, and IFC judgments
will typically look like
∆ ⊢ {λx . (P ,N ,A)} c {λx . λek . λv . (P ′,N ′,A′)}
Note that P links x to values on the stack and heap, so allowing the
classification functions to depend on x allows for the same kind of
value-dependent classifications as Murray et al [11] and Costanzo
and Shao [8] have. For instance, the classification of one variable
might depend on a boolean flag stored in another variable.
This change now allows the IFC judgment to “see” the depen-
dency of the pre- and postcondition on x , so its definition will be
able to vary the value of the x it passes to them in the same way it
varies the state σ1 to σ
′
1. This will allow variations of the values of
Hi variables between σ1 to σ
′
1 without the precondition P prevent-
ing them, because we require that P x σ1 and P x
′ σ ′1 hold, instead
of requiring that the same P holds for both σ1 and σ
′
1 as we did in
Definition 4.2.
4.9 Semantics of IFC judgment: Second attempt
Now, since N and A depend on an x that we want to vary to an x ′,
we might get two different classifications: One variable might be
classified as Lo byN x but asHi byN x ′. So we adapt the definition
of low-equivalence as follows:
Definition 4.3 (Low-equivalence). Two states σ = 〈e,k,m〉 and
σ ′ = 〈e ′,k ′,m′〉 are called low-equivalent with respect to the clas-
sification functions N , N ′ and A, A′ if for all stack locations ℓ for
which N ℓ = Lo = N ′ ℓ, we have e ℓ = e ′ ℓ and for all heap
locations ℓ for which A ℓ = Lo = A′ ℓ, we havem ℓ =m′ ℓ.
Note that we only require equality if both classifications are Lo.
Costanzo and Shao [8] do so as well, and it seems that this is the
most useful definition: It is strong enough to obtain a meaningful
statement, because one just has to make sure that the locations we
care about have constant Lo classifications.
As in the first attempt, we temporarily ignore premature exits
in the following definition:
Definition 4.4 (Meaning of IFC judgment, second attempt). The
meaning of ∆ ⊢ {λx . (P1,N1,A1)} c {λx . (P2,N2,A2)} is: For all x ,
the VST judgment ∆ ⊢ {P1 x} c {P2 x} holds and for all x , x
′, σ1,
σ ′1, σ2, σ
′
2, if P1 x σ1 and P1 x
′ σ ′1 hold and both in σ1 and σ
′
1, the
command to be executed is c , and σ1 is low-equivalent to σ
′
1 w.r.t
N1 x , N1 x
′ and A1 x , A1 x
′ and σ1 ⇓ σ2 and σ
′
1 ⇓ σ
′
2 , then σ2 is
low-equivalent to σ ′2 w.r.t N2 x , N2 x
′ and A2 x , A2 x
′.
As one can see, the VST part of the definition only quantifies
over one x , whereas the IFC part of the definition quantifies over
two different x and x ′.
This definition might be fine, but it does not account for prema-
ture exits, so we have to look at them in the following subsections.
4.10 C light operational semantics for break,
continue, and return
VST’s C light operational semantics include a stack of continua-
tions to be executed in the program state. A continuation can be
a sequence of two statements to be resumed at the second state-
ment, a loop to be resumed at its increment statement, a loop to
be resumed at its body, or a function body to be resumed after a
return.
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That is, a program state σ can be written as 〈e,k,m〉, where e
is the environment of local stack variables, k is the continuation
stack, andm is the heap memory.3
VST defines a function exit_cont, which takes an exitkind,
an optional return value, and a continuation stack, and pops the
continuation stack according to the exitkind, pushing the return
value into the environment of the calling function in the case of
EKret.
Instead of presenting all the details of VST’s operational seman-
tics, we just show one example, the rule for break:
step-break
〈e, exit_cont EKbrk None k,m〉 → σ
〈e, break :: k,m〉 → σ
The double colon stands for list cons of the continuation stack,
and (exit_cont EKbrk None k) is defined to pop the continua-
tion stack k until it encounters a continuation standing for a loop
to be resumed at its increment statement, which it also pops, so
that execution will continue after the loop.
4.11 Third attempt: Adding premature exits
Using the exit_cont function, we can now add support for prema-
ture exits to our information flow security definition:
Definition 4.5 (Meaning of IFC judgment, third attempt). Themean-
ing of ∆ ⊢ {λx . (P1,N1,A1)} c {λx . λek . λv . (P2,N2,A2)} is: For all
x , the VST judgment ∆ ⊢ {P1 x} c {P2 x} holds and for allx, x
′, ek,v,v ′, e1, e
′
1,m1,m
′
1,k, e2, e
′
2,m2,m
′
2,
if P1 x 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 and P1 x
′ 〈e ′1, c :: k,m
′
1〉 hold, and e1 is low-
equivalent to e ′1 w.r.t. N1 x , N1 x
′, andm1 is low-equivalent tom
′
1
w.r.t.A1 x ,A1 x
′, and 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 →
∗ 〈e2, exit_cont ek v k,m2〉
and 〈e ′1, c :: k,m
′
1〉 →
∗ 〈e ′2, exit_cont ek v
′ k,m′2〉 then e2 is low-
equivalent to e ′2 w.r.t. N2 x , N2 x
′, andm2 is low-equivalent tom
′
2
w.r.t. A2 x , A2 x
′.
Note that we now have to consider an execution from a continu-
ation stack of the form c :: k to the stack exit_cont ek v k , rather
than from a stack containing only the command c to an empty
stack, because eg. in ∆ ⊢ {P} break; c2 {R}, the break might skip
more commands than just c2.
4.12 Problems inverting multistep
Trying to prove Hoare rules sound with respect to Definition 4.5 re-
vealed the following problem: Such proofs have to invert hypothe-
ses of the form 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 →
∗ 〈e2, exit_cont ek v k,m2〉 to
get information about how the command c was executed. This is
problematic even in the simplest case where ek = EKnrm, which
simplifies to 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 →
∗ 〈e2,k,m2〉: If c is inside a loop body,
and k contains a loop continuation, it might have happened that
after running c and arriving at continuation stack k , another loop
iteration was performed, going through a state with continuation
stack c :: k again, and then arriving at continuation stack k . That
is, the commands executed during 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 →
∗ 〈e2,k,m2〉
could be not just c , but also parts of k , but all available hypotheses
only talk about the execution of c , not k .
So 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 →
∗ 〈e2,k,m2〉 does not express what we want
it to express, and we have to find a better definition for themeaning
of the IFC judgment.
3In fact, VST also defines a corestate for the case where execution is in an external
functions, but we ignore this for the moment.
4.13 VST’s guard-based soundness proof
Similar problems must have occurred in the VST soundness proof,
and VST solves them as follows: Contrary to what one might ex-
pect, VST does not define the meaning of its Hoare judgment as
follows:
Definition 4.6 (Meaning of Hoare judgment, unusable definition).
Themeaning of∆ ⊢ {P} c {R} is: For all e1,m1,k , if P 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉
holds, then there exist ek,v, e2,m2 such that 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 →
∗
〈e2, exit_cont ek v k,m2〉 and R ek v 〈e2, exit_cont ek v k,m2〉
holds.
Instead, it is defined with the following series of definitions:
Definition 4.7 (Immediately safe). A state σ = 〈e,k,m〉 is imme-
diately safe if k = nil or σ → σ2 for some σ2.
Definition 4.8 (Safe). A state σ is safe if for all σ2, if σ →
∗ σ2,
then σ2 is immediately safe.
Definition 4.9 (Guard). Predicate P guards the continuation stack
k , written {P} k , if for all e andm, P 〈e,k,m〉 implies that 〈e,k,m〉
is safe.
Definition 4.10 (Return guard). Postcondition R guards the con-
tinuation stackk , written {R} k , if for all ek andv , we have {R ek v} k .
Definition 4.11 (Meaning of Hoare judgment). The meaning of
∆ ⊢ {P} c {R} is: For all k , {R} k implies {P} (c :: k).
It might look like the above definition only talks about safety in
the sense of absence of crashes, but in fact, it does guarantee func-
tional correctness, because k could be any program which tests
whether R holds, and crashes if it does not hold. Then, the above
definition guarantees that after running c , R must hold.
4.14 Final definition of the IFC judgment
Definition 4.12 (Equivalent continuations). Two continuations c1
and c2 are called equivalent, written c1 ≡cont c2, if they are equal
or they are both a function body to be resumed after a return, of
the same function, but with potentially different variable environ-
ments to be restored.
Definition 4.13 (Head-equivalent states). Two statesσ = 〈e,k,m〉
and σ ′ = 〈e ′,k ′,m′〉 are called head-equivalent, written σ ≡head
σ ′ if either both k and k ′ are the empty stack, or both are non-
empty and their head (top) continuations are equivalent.
Definition 4.14 (Sync). Two states σ1 and σ
′
1 are called “in sync”,
4
written σ1 ≡sync σ
′
1, if for all n,σ2,σ
′
2 , if σ1 →n σ2 and σ
′
1 →n σ
′
2,
then σ2 ≡head σ
′
2 .
Sync can be thought of as some kind of low-equivalence, with
the advantage that it does not need any classification functions,
which are typically only available for the program state right be-
fore and right after the command in question, but not for interme-
diate states or future states.
In fact, low-equivalence between two memories for a bit stored
at heap location ℓ can be encoded as follows using sync: Let k be a
continuation stack whose program loads the bit at location ℓ and
then branches on the value of that bit, executing some command c0
4We are still looking for a better name for this definition, suggestions are welcome!
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if it is 0, or some different command c1 (such that c0 ≡cont c1 does
not hold) if it is 1. Now if we have two variable environments e1
and e ′1, and twomemoriesm1 andm
′
1, and wewant to say that after
running some given command c , the bit at ℓ must be the same in
both memories, we can express this as 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 ≡sync 〈e
′
1, c ::
k,m′1〉. If c terminates, it does so in a certain number of steps n,
and after n + 1 steps, execution will be in k and branch on the
value stored at ℓ, putting c0 or c1 on top of the continuation stack
depending on the bit stored at ℓ, and since sync requires the two
continuation stack heads to be equivalent, it is ensured that the
value stored at ℓ in the two memories is the same.
That is, we can append a “test continuation” k to the command c
in question, which makes the sync proposition false if any equality
we desire to hold does not hold.
We can use this intuition to define an IFC guard in a similar way
as VST’s guard:
Definition 4.15 (IFC guard). We write {λx . (P ,N ,A)} k k ′ if for
all x, x ′, e, e ′,m,m′, if P x 〈e,k,m〉 and P x ′ 〈e ′,k ′,m′〉 hold, and e
is low-equivalent to e ′ w.r.t. N x,N x ′ andm is low-equivalent to
m′ w.r.t. A x,A x ′, then 〈e,k,m〉 ≡sync 〈e
′,k ′,m′〉.
Definition 4.16 (IFC return guard). We write {R} k k ′ if for all
ek and v , we have {λx .R x ek v} k k ′.
Definition 4.17 (Meaning of IFC judgment, final version). Themean-
ing of∆ ⊢ {P} c {R} is: For allx , theVST judgment ∆ ⊢ {P1 x} c {P2 x}
holds and for all k and k ′, {R} k k ′ implies {P} (c :: k) (c :: k ′).
Note: VST has one forallx in front of thewhole judgment, whereas
IFC has a forall inside both guards (the iguard and the irguard).
4.15 Discussion
This definition crucially depends on the restriction that branching
on Hi data is not allowed.
5 RULES
5.1 The lattice
To classify the security level of values, we use the two-point lattice
called label, whose element Lo is the bottom element ⊥ and Hi is
the top element ⊤. We write Lo ⊑ Hi for the lattice order, ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2
for the least upper bound, and ℓ1 ⊓ ℓ2 for the greatest lower bound.
If L is a lattice, then for any type T , the type T → L is a lattice
as well, and we use the same operators for lattices lifted over tuple
types, exitkinds, stack locations and heap locations.
5.2 Expression classification
We define the function clsf_expr, which takes a stack classification
N and a VST C light expression e and returns a label giving the
highest classification of any variable occurring in e . Since expres-
sions are pure, heap-independent, and cannot make function calls,
it suffices to give N as an argument, and no heap classification is
needed. Together with clsf_expr, we also define clsf_lvalue, which
classifies an l-value expression, and finally, we define clsf_exprs to
work on a list of expressions.
ifc-loop
∆ ⊢ {P} c {λx . λek . λv .
©­­­
«
P ′ x
R x EKnrm None
P ′ x
R x EKret v
ª®®®
¬ek
}
∆ ⊢ {P ′} cinc {λx . λek . λv . (P x, ⊥, ⊥, R x EKret v)ek }
∆ ⊢ {P} loop(cinc)c {R}
ifc-seq
∆ ⊢ {P} c1 {λek .λv . if ek = EKnrm then Q else R ek v}
∆ ⊢ {Q} c2 {R}
∆ ⊢ {P} c1; c2 {R}
ifc-break
∆ ⊢ {λx .R x EKbrk None} break {R}
ifc-continue
∆ ⊢ {λx .R x EKcont None} continue {R}
ifc-if
∀x, P x ⊢ clsf_expr (N x) b = Lo
∆ ⊢ {λx . (P x ∧ nbo = true,N x,A x)} c1 {R}
∆ ⊢ {λx . (P x ∧ nbo = false,N x,A x)} c2 {R}
∆ ⊢ {λx . (P x,N x,A x)} if b then c1 else c2 {R}
Figure 2: Control flow rules (with explicit logical variable x)
5.3 Notational conventions
The enum type exitkind has the four values EKnrm, EKbrk, EKcont,
and EKret. Given a variable ek holding an exit kind, we define the
notation (f1, f2, f3, f4)ek to mean
match ek with
| EKnrm ⇒ f1
| EKbrk ⇒ f2
| EKcont ⇒ f3
| EKret ⇒ f4
end
in order to select the appropriate postcondition from a quadru-
ple with a postcondition for each exitkind.
We define the operator nret to assert that a command exits nor-
mally:
nret P := λek . λv . if ek = EKnrm then P else (⊥,⊥,⊥)
Note that the first ⊥ means false (a VST assertion), the second ⊥
is an element of the lifted lattice T→ ident→ label, and the third
bot is an element of the lifted lattice T→ heap_loc→ label.
We use the notation f [x := v] for function update, i.e.
f [x := v] := λx0. if x0 = x then v else f x0
and in examples, we use square brackets for function literals, e.g.
[sec : Hi, pub : Lo]
To make such functions total, we assume that they return the de-
fault value Hi for undefined locations.
5.4 The rules
The control flow rules are given in Figure 2. They are the same in
VST, except that all assertions also abstract over a logical variable
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ifc-pre
P ⊢ (P ′ ∧ N ⊑ N ′ ∧A ⊑ A′)
∆ ⊢ {P ′,N ′,A′} c {R}
∆ ⊢ {P ,N ,A} c {R}
ifc-post
∆ ⊢ {P} c {P ′,N ′,A′}
∀ek v . P ′ ek v ⊢ (P ek v ∧ N ′ ⊑ N ∧A′ ⊑ A)
∆ ⊢ {P} c {P ,N ,A}
Figure 3: Consequence rules (with implicit lifting over x)
ifc-set
P ⊢ neo = v
P ⊢ clsf_expr N e = ℓ
∆ ⊢ {
©­
«
P
N
A
ª®
¬
} id=e {nret
©­
«
nido = v ∧ ∃v ′. P[v ′/id]
N [id := ℓ]
A
ª®
¬
}
ifc-load
P ⊢ (n&eo = p ∧ (p 7→ v) ∗ ⊤)
P ⊢ (clsf_expr N e = ℓ1 ∧ A p = ℓ2)
∆ ⊢ {
©­
«
P
N
A
ª®
¬
} id=e {nret
©­
«
nido = v ∧ ∃v ′. P[v ′/id]
N [id := ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2]
A
ª®
¬
}
ifc-store
P ⊢ (n&e1o = p ∧ ne2o = v)
P ⊢ (clsf_lvalue N e1 = ℓ1 ∧ clsf_expr N e2 = ℓ2)
∆ ⊢ {
©­
«
P ∗ p 7→ _
N
A
ª®
¬
} e1=e2 {nret
©­
«
P ∗ p 7→ v
N
A[p := ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2]
ª®
¬
}
Figure 4: Rules for assignment, load and store (with implicit
lifting over x)
x of some user-defined typeT . In ifc-if, we require that the expres-
sion b does not contain any Hi values, to make sure that the low-
equivalent states do not take different execution paths. Note that
to prove this, onemay assume that the precondition P x holds. This
is important in the case of value-dependent classifications, where
the classification might only be low if some requirements on x (en-
coded by P ) hold.
To keep the notation sane in Figures 3 and 4, we assume im-
plicit lifting of all operators over an argument x : T , where T is a
user-defined record of logical variables. For instance, the ⊢ operator
refers now to the one from lifted separation logic, so P ⊢ Q really
means ∀x : T . P x ⊢ Q x , and the triple constructor is assumed to
be lifted, that is, {P ,N ,A} stands for {λx . (P x,N x,A x))}.
5.5 Function specifications
Function specifications are a quintuple ((f , s),N ,A,N ′,A′) (or a
record in Coq) consisting of a VST function specification s and
a function name f , and pre- and post-classification functions for
stack and heap. Note that the only purpose of N ′ is to classify the
return value, the other local variables don’t matter after the return.
They all are parameterized by a logical variable x of typeT , where
T is the same type as the WITH-clause type of f .
ifc-call
∀x : T0 . F ∗ P[
−→v /−→y ] ⊢ n−→e o = −→v ∧ clsf_exprs N0
−→e ⊑ N −→y
f (−→y ) : {λx : T . (P ,N ,A)} {λx : T . (P ′,N ′,A′)} ∈ ∆
∀x : T . P ′ ⊢ N ′ ret_val = ℓret
∆ ⊢ {λx : T0.
©­
«
F ∗ P[−→v /−→y ]
N0
A0 ⊓ A
ª®
¬
} id=f (−→e ) {λx : T0.
©­
«
F ∗ P ′[id/ret_val]
N0[id := ℓret]
A0 ⊓A
′
ª®
¬
}
ifc-return
∆ ⊢ {λx .R x EKret neo} return e {R}
Figure 5: Rules for function call and return (WIP)
ifc-load
∀x .prop P localQ sepR ⊢ n&eo = q ∧ q = a ⊲ f
∀x . f = f0++f1 Ri = (a p
f0
−→
t
v ′)
∀x .(the component in v ′ denoted by f1) = v
∀x .prop P localQ sepR ⊢ clsf_expr N e = ℓ1 ∧ A q = ℓ2
∀x .(Q with the value for id updated to v) = Q ′
(λid0. if id0 = id then ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 else N id0) = N
′
∆ ⊢ {λx . ((prop P localQ sepR),N ,A)}
id = e
{λx . nret (prop P localQ ′ sepR,N ′,A)}
Figure 6: Canonical load rule
Instead of writing function specifications as such a quintuple,
we will write
f (−→y ) : {λx : T . (P ,N ,A)} {λx : T . (P ′,N ′,A′)}
Note that contrary to VST, we do not use a Π to quantify over an
x of type T , because that’s left to the definition of the meaning of
the IFC judgment.
5.6 Call rules
Note that the call rule in Figure 5 is work in progress. We expect
thatHi could be used as a default for classifying heap parts outside
the heap accessible to the function, and then the greatest lower
bound A0 ⊓ A could be used to “join”
5 two heap classifications.
Also, we should investigate how the logical (x : T0) from caller
connects to the logical (x : T ) from the callee.
5.7 Rules in canonical form
Some rules in canonical formwere developed in Coq, one of which
is shown in Figure 6.
6 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS/DIMENSIONS
6.1 Modeling premature exits
Nomatter whether the operational semantics are small-step or big-
step, there are two ways to model premature exits such as break,
continue, return before the end of the function body, or excep-
tions:
5Unfortunately, the pun doesn’t work, it’s just the wrong way round: Greatest lower
bound is a synonym for meet, not join.
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With immediately jumping exit commands. This is the approach
used in VST: For instance, the break command jumps directly out-
side the loop (without even “consuming” an execution step), and
similarly for the other exit commands.
With extended states storing the exitkind. In this approach, one
defines an extended state to be either a normal state, or an abrupt
state. Premature exit commands step from a normal state to an
abrupt state, and only the next step specifies how to continue after
the the abrupt state. This approach is used in seL4. It is described
in Norbert Schirmer’s PhD thesis [12] for both small-step and big-
step semantics.
As explained in section 4.12, the VST approach has the prob-
lem that neither 〈e1, c :: k,m1〉 →
∗ 〈e2,k,m2〉 nor 〈e1, c,m1〉 →
∗
〈e2, nil,m2〉 expresses what we need for a direct-style definition of
the meaning of a Hoare triple. The seL4 approach, however, does
not suffer from this problem, because the hypothesis (Normal s, c) →∗
(Abrupt s ′, nil) exactly captureswhatwewant to say, because it can
store an exitkind inside the state.
6.2 Direct-style vs guard-style
We decided to use a guard-style definition (as inAppel and Blazy [1]
and used in VST) for our IFC Hoare judgment, because of the rea-
sons outlined in section 4 and for better compatibility with VST.
However, a direct-style definition would be more understand-
able for users.
It should be investigated further what implications this design
decision has on proofs about concurrent programs, and whether it
is possible to write proofs that the guard-style definition implies a
direct-style definition.
6.3 Assertions about intermediate states
If we use a small-step direct-style definition, the question arises
whether the definition of the IFC Hoare judgment should make
an assertion only about the final state reached after executing the
statement in question, or also about all intermediate steps. This
might have implications on proofs, especially proofs about compo-
sitionality for concurrency.
However, we have to keep in mind that the IFC Hoare judgment
is only provided classification functions for the initial and final
state, but not for the intermediate states, so if some kind of low-
equivalence is to be asserted about intermediate states, this cannot
use classification functions. One way to deal with this problem is
to use a judgment like sync (Definition 4.14), which makes some
guarantees without needing classification functions.
6.4 How to define what we prove
We can distinguish twoways to give the semantics of non-interference
proofs:
With proof rules proven sound. In this approach one defines a se-
max judgment, where the right-hand side of the definition is the
non-interference property we want to prove. Then, one proves sev-
eral rules, typically one for each kind of statement. This approach
is used in this paper, by VST [4] and by the seL4 non-interference
proofs [10].
With typing derivations. In this approach, one defines a typing
judgment using inference rules, and writes a soundness proof stat-
ing that if a typing derivation for a program can be found, then the
desired non-interference property holds. This approach is used in
Murray’s CSF 16 paper [11], and also by Costanzo and Shao [8].
7 TOWARDS A FIRST MILESTONE
7.1 Next steps
Investigate function calls. Howdoes the stack classification change
before and after function calls? ifc-return does not need to deal
with this, because it only goes to an equivalent state which has not
returned yet, so ifc-call does all the work here, and this should
work, because the rule “knows” both the “outer” and “inner” stack.
There is an ifc-call rule on paper, but it should be implemented
in Coq and tried out with an example.
Guard-style vs direct-style. Does guard-style soundness imply
direct-style soundness for VST? For IFC? Can we prove this in
Coq?
Finish proving IFC Hoare rules. Proving soundness of the IFC
Hoare rules w.r.t. our IFC definition.
Step-indexed assertions. Currently, all the IFC development is
using assertions of type env→ temp_env→ mem→ Prop instead of
environ→ mpred, and admits a conversion function between the
two, as well as some properties of this conversion function, none of
which probably holds. This gap should be closed, that is, we should
use environ→ mpred in the IFC development as well.
Connect basic IFC rules with IFC rules in canonical form. Cur-
rently, some basic IFC rules are used directly in the examples, while
for others, an IFC rule in canonical form is admitted. For all com-
mands, we should have IFC rules in canonical form, and prove
themw.r.t. to the basic IFC rules. It will be interesting to see how/whether
parts of the Floyd proofs can be reused for this.
More examples. We should verify more and larger examples to
evaluate the usability and expressivity of the system.
7.2 Pending implementation tasks
Lifting over logical variables. All assertions need to be lifted over
a record containing logical variables. Some investigations in the
file ifc/proofauto_lemmas.v suggest that the same lifting infras-
tructure that VST uses to lift assertions over the environ could be
used to additionally lift the assertions over a record of logical vari-
ables, but this has not yet been applied to the whole development.
Include IFC information in ∆. The environment ∆ should now
contain ifc_funspecs instead of VST funspecs. It will be inter-
esting to see how well the existing VST-Floyd proof automation
infrastructure supports this change.
8 FUTURE WORK
Influence of VST on our definitions. It would be interesting to
ask what our definitions would look like if we were starting from
scratch, i.e. not attempting to reuse the VST soundness proof. Does
that statement follow from the one we’re proposing?
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Declassification. Can we support declassification by precondi-
tions in the same neat way as Costanzo and Shao [8]? Probably
not directly, because they need to attach labels to logical variables
to make it work, which we currently don’t do.
Branching on Hi data. Is a two-execution semantics needed for
this, bisimulations? Or can we get away with just a better defini-
tion of sync? Instead of asserting same branching behavior, maybe
assert same output, or same termination behavior?
9 RELATED WORK
Murray et al [10] prove information flow security properties for
the seL4 kernel, which is implemented in C. Their proofs are on a
more abstract level, and rely on previously established refinement
proofs between the abstract level and the actual C code. In con-
trast, our project allows fine-grained reasoning about the low-level
layout of data using separation logic, which is more convenient
for certain applications where the security property can only be
stated by speaking about the low-level layout of memory buffers,
i.e. in cases where abstracting into a higher-level language makes
no sense.
Moreover, the information flow statement for seL4 is statedwith
respect to big-step operational semantics, which are not directly
usable to reason about concurrency. Equivalence to small-step se-
mantics was therefore proved [12], but recent success with con-
current separation logic [3] suggests that it is worth looking at a
continuation-passing style small-step definition.
Beringer [6] describes relational decomposition, a technique to
reduce proofs involving two executions, such as non-interference
proofs, to proofs involving only one execution. This might turn out
to be useful for the soundness proofs of our IFC Hoare rules, but it
requires that one already has stated an information flow security
property, so it solves a different problem than the main contribu-
tion of this paper.
Costanzo and Shao [8] prove non-interference for a simple im-
perative toy language with pointer arithmetic and aliasing, also
based on Separation Hoare Logic. They define instrumented op-
erational semantics, where each value is a tuple of a value and a
sensitivity label, and prove theorems to go from the instrumented
semantics to erased semantics and vice versa. This seems to be a
nice way to prove non-interference, but it is not clear how well in-
strumenting the operational semantics would scale to a real-world
language like C.
Beaumont et al [5] present a cross-domain desktop compositor,
a device allowing to use the same screen, keyboard and mouse for
different machines containing data of different sensitivity classifi-
cations. Formally verifying the correctness of their input/output
dispatch code would be a typical use case for the system proposed
in this paper.
Murray et al [11] propose a toy language system which also has
value-dependent classifications, but they allow branching on high
data and show how to refine programs such that the number of
execution steps is preserved, which is needed for compositionality
in a concurrent setting.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, it is rarely a good idea to include the same section
three times in a paper, or to have a conclusion that does not con-
clude.
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